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ALBANIA: A DENIAL OF THE OTTOMAN PAST 
(SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS AND POLITICS OF MEMORY)1
Rezumat
Albania: negarea trecutului otoman (manualele 
şcolare şi politicile de conservare a memoriei)
În şcolile din Albania postcomunistă, pe lângă ma-
nualele destinate pentru predarea istoriei, de asemenea, în 
calitate de material didactic suplimentar sunt utilizate şi 
atlasele şcolare. Faptele şi relatările istorice ale trecutului 
otoman, menţionate atât prin texte cât şi prin hărţi, sunt in-
discret denaturate şi marginalizate. Ca rezultat, în prezent, 
cetăţeanul albanez este incapabil să explice de ce în Albania, 
unde predomină un sistem de guvernământ musulman, în 
acelaşi timp persistă un grad considerabil de toleranţă poli-
confesionalistă. Cu toate acestea, curricula şcolară albaneză 
la disciplina „Istorie” continuă să propage în mod denaturat 
sentimentul antiotoman încapsulat de stereotipurile „jugul 
turcesc” sau „cinci secole de ocupaţie turcească”. Acest „an-
tiosmanism” implantat în cultura şi discursul public alba-
nez a devenit un „corp străin” pentru statul albanez, care 
are un caracter musulman şi policonfesnional. 
Cuvinte-cheie: Albania, „antiosmanism”, dhimmi, 
politici de conservare a memoriei, atlase şcolare la discipli-
na „Istorie”, curricula şcolară la disciplina „Istorie”, manua-
le şcolare la disciplina „Istorie”.
Резюме
Албания: отрицание османского наследия (школь-
ные учебники и политики сохранения памяти)
В школах посткоммунистической Албании, наря-
ду с учебниками по истории, в качестве дополнитель-
ного дидактического материала также используются и 
школьные атласы. Изложение информации об исто-
рических событиях османского прошлого, как упо-
минаемых в текстах, так и представленных в картах, 
явно искажено и маргинализировано. Как следствие, 
в настоящее время албанский гражданин не спосо-
бен объяснить, почему в Албании, с преобладанием 
системы мусульманского правления, в то же время в 
значительной степени сохраняется толерантность к 
поликонфессиональности. Вместе с тем, албанский 
школьный куррикулум по дисциплине «История», 
искажая реальность, продолжает пропагандировать 
антиосманские чувства, овеянные стереотипами «ту-
рецкое иго» или «пять веков турецкой оккупации». Та-
кой «антиосманизм», внедренный в культуру и обще-
ственный дискурс Албании, стал «инородным телом» 
для албанского государства, носящего мусульманский 
и поликонфессиональный характер. 
Ключевые слова: Албания, «антиосманизм», 
дхимми, политики сохранения памяти, школьные ат-
ласы, школьный куррикулум по дисциплине «Исто-
рия», школьные учебники по дисциплине «История».
Summary
Albania: A Denial of the Ottoman past (School 
textbooks and politics of memory)
In post-communist Albania’s schools, alongside reg-
ular textbooks of history for teaching the subject, school 
atlases of history are also employed as a prescribed or 
adjunct textbook. In the stories and facts related through 
texts and maps, the Ottoman past is curiously warped 
and marginalized. As a result, the average Albanian is left 
incapable of explaining why Albania is a predominantly 
Muslim polity, but with a considerable degree of tolerant 
poly-confessionalism. Furthermore, school history educa-
tion in Albania propagates the unreflective anti-Ottoman 
feeling encapsulated by the stereotypes of ‘Turkish yoke’ 
or ‘the five centuries of Turkish occupation.’ This simplis-
tic anti-Ottomanism of Albanian culture and public dis-
course is strangely at variance with the Muslim and poly-
confessional character of Albania. 
Key words: Albania, anti-Ottomanism, dhimmi, pol-
itics of memory, school atlases of history, school history 
education, school history textbooks.
During my trips abroad, I developed a curious cus-
tom of purchasing history textbooks used in a given coun-
try’s schools. I also checked on the existence of a history at-
las as a genre of regular or adjunct textbook. Colleagues of 
mine were flabbergasted, because sojourns abroad should 
be more fun than going back to some fusty classroom, 
even notionally. However, taxi drivers, shop assistants, café 
owners, professors, and local travelers whom I meet in the 
country of my visit had to learn from exactly such text-
books and atlases of history. In the course of their compul-
sory education, a certain image of their own nation-state 
and of the outside world in relation to it was firmly placed 
in their heads. Now, for better or worse, as adults, they ob-
serve reality through the prism of these early school images 
(or rather, stereotypes) that are implanted in their minds, 
solidified, and came to constitute ‘the truth’, the national 
dogma, an ideological yardstick, against which events in 
their own nation-state and abroad must be assessed2.
It is next to impossible to take off these nationally-
tinted spectacles, because hardly anyone notices their ex-
istence in the first place. The ‘textbook truth’ about ‘our 
nation’ and the wider world becomes naturalized3. Rarely 
are we jostled out from this easy complacency, most often 
when we talk about exactly the same events from the past 
to people who received their education in another country. 
We are as much surprised about their ‘incorrect’ interpre-
tation of these events as they about ours. We may take of-
fense or decide to avoid the touchy subject for the sake of 
politeness. As a result, these invisible spectacles continue 
to sit on our nose and distort reality in the nationally-in-
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flected manner, as intended by our country’s ministry of 
education, in line with the national curriculum that has to 
be followed by all schools across our homeland. 
A lot of disagreements and misunderstandings among 
people coming from different countries – be them personal 
or at the level of politics and scholarship – have their source 
in national-skewed school education [67]. In earlier ages, 
prior to the rise of the ideal of free and compulsory edu-
cation for all, religions tended to put stereotypes in chil-
dren’s heads. Nowadays, when we are awash with veritable 
pet bytes of textual and audiovisual information available 
online, the ‘correct and advisable’ trajectory of national 
thinking about the past and the present is set out in the 
state’s officially managed Geschichtspolitik (politics of his-
tory, politics of memory). With lavish governmental sup-
port, ‘promising’ research projects are pursued, ‘appropri-
ate’ books are published in steep runs, films on ‘glorious 
national stories’ are produced, and ‘nationally correct’ con-
tent is copiously generated for websites. This swelling wave 
of ‘correct thinking’ about the past drowns out other views 
and interpretations, pushing them under rubrics marked 
as ‘unreliable’, ‘eccentric’, ‘wrong’, or outright ‘lunatic’ [84]. 
In this way, facts and events, which do not fit into the ap-
proved national master narrative, are brushed away from 
the public purview, downgraded to the status of ‘informa-
tion noise’, which every ‘appropriately’ educated citizen 
is conditioned to reject on the first reading or watching, 
deeming them as ‘incorrect’ by default. The erstwhile dis-
cussion between different points of view is replaced by 
the brutal duel fought through the exponentially growing 
volume of ‘appropriate information’, ever faster and more 
broadly disseminated. It is eerily close to cyber war [26]. 
That national story wins what is repeated more frequently 
and imparted with the use of more ubiquitous and intru-
sive online and offline instruments. There is a popular (and 
as such un-attributable) 20th century saying ‘a lie repeated a 
hundred times becomes the truth’. That is why, the average 
citizen has heard so much about the German, American 
(i.e. USA) or Russian history, but next to nothing about 
the Albanian, Burkina Faso or Laotian history, or let alone 
about the past of sub-states or cross-border regions and 
their populations. In this globalized world of nowadays, a 
couple of such most distinctly visible (read: overpowering) 
national master narratives are posed to constitute the skel-
eton of modernity (modern thinking) to which all other 
extant national histories must be fitted [34].
Albanian Textbooks of History
In late November 2015, my over two-decade-old 
dream came true and I visited Albania at the invitation of 
Bardhyl Selimi, a retired professor of mathematics and a 
leading Esperantist in this country. Prompted by my ques-
tions about school atlases of history, Bardhyl took me for a 
leisurely walk across the center of the capital city of Tirana 
to visit the National Library of Albania. A brief search in 
the library’s e-catalog yielded few hits and merely those 
school atlases that had been published during the commu-
nist times. Bardhyl shrugged and could not help me more, 
because his two sons finished elementary education before 
the fall of communism. During some leisure time in be-
tween lectures and other official engagements, I persisted 
and enquired young kids about these school atlases. They 
confirmed my hunch that such atlases do exist. It appears 
that the National Library either does not collect them, or 
has a cataloging backlog in this field that goes back to the 
early 1990s. It may not be that surprising, when one bears 
in mind the fact that in 1997 all structures of the post-
communist Albanian state collapsed, the economy suf-
fered a complete meltdown and the civil war ensued [52].
Tirana’s Mediterranean climate and the compact 
shape of its center makes the city friendly to flaneurs, de-
spite the heavy traffic, the almost non-existence of pave-
ments, uneven street surfaces and missing manhole cov-
ers. I developed a voracious taste for walks that brought me 
to all sorts of neighborhoods and half-concealed corners, 
including some local bookstores unknown to tourists. I 
also discovered that, like in Turkey, school textbooks can 
be more readily found in stationery shops than in regular 
bookstores. The persistence paid off. I managed to buy sev-
en school atlases of history published in the 21st century.
Two of these atlases are adaptations and partial trans-
lations from the German and Italian originals [9]. All of 
them cover world history, with the exception of a single 
atlas solely devoted to the Albanian national master nar-
rative [81]. One of the atlases was published in Macedonia 
and is also distributed in Albania and Kosovo [16], while 
another appeared in Tirana, but it is sold in Kosovo and 
Macedonia, as well [33]. Most of these atlases are ear-
marked for the subsequent school grades, namely, 4th, [60], 
7th [54], and 8th [55; 81].
The Albanian-language general atlases of world his-
tory, with the predictable focus on Europe, features either 
special thematic sections or single maps devoted to Alba-
nian history [9, p. 10, 16, 28, 31, 34-35, 41, 58-60, 70, 85; 
33, p. 64-91; 54, p. 17-19; 55, p. 10-11; 60, p. 9, 23-25]. On 
top of that, in order to get a better insight into how the 
Albanian national master narrative is taught in Albanian 
schools, I also bought two alternative textbooks of history 
for the last (12th) grade of secondary school, since they are 
entirely devoted to Albanian history [82; 91]. To this lot, I 
added three school atlases of world geography [6; 7] and 
three more of Albanian geography [20], because they offer 
the geographical image of the ‘Albanian world’ that closely 
corresponds to the national master narrative propagated 
in history textbooks and school atlases of history. All the 
school atlases of geography are predictably devoted to ‘eth-
nic Albania’, understood as composed of Albania, Kosovo 
and the western part of Macedonia. Furthermore, the 
three atlases exclusively on Albanian geography, through 
maps on this subject, explicitly propose that the ‘true eth-
nic Albania’ consists of Albania proper, Kosovo, western 
Macedonia (including the Macedonian capital of Sko-
pje), the sliver of northwestern Greece (Chameria, that 
is, Çamëria in Albanian and Τσαμουριά [Tsamouriá] in 
Greek), southernmost Montenegro (with the Montenegrin 
capital of Podgorica) and a piece of southernmost Serbia 
(that is, the Preshevo Valley in Albanian and Прешево 
[Preševo] Valley in Serbian)4. These six territories are typi-
cally depicted as ‘islands’ separated from one another by 
E-ISSN 2537–6152             REVISTA DE ETNOLOGIE ŞI CULTUROLOGIE           Chișinău, 2016         Volumul XX98
broad notional white divides (which obviously do not ex-
ist in the terrain represented), suggesting that this separa-
tion is unjust and will be overcome in the future [20, p. 
24]. Worryingly, this presentation of the ethnic (or rather 
ethno-linguistic) lands of the Albanians (that is, Albanian-
speakers) implants in schoolchildren’s minds an image that 
in the future may put them at loggerheads with their coun-
terparts from Albania’s and Kosovo’s neighboring states. 
As it is well known, ethno-linguistic and historic claims of 
the territory, as proposed by political elites and nationally-
minded scholars from the Balkan nation-states, would re-
quire a Balkan Peninsula several times bigger than it is now 
in order to be fully satisfied.
National Identity: Religion and Language
The Albanians are rightly proud of the fact that they 
built a poly-confessional nation-state where religious or 
ethno-religious strife and conflict are conspicuously ab-
sent. According to the 2011 census, nearly 60 per cent of 
the country’s inhabitants profess Islam (including Bektash-
ism), 10 per cent Roman Catholicism, and almost 7 per 
cent Orthodox Christianity, while the remaining 23 per 
cent either did not declare their religion in the latest cen-
sus or are atheists [76, p. 3]. The story is starkly different 
in today’s Kosovo, where almost 96 per cent of the popula-
tion are Muslims. The rest are Christians (Catholics and 
Orthodox) and non-believers. In Kosovo the confessional 
divide tends to coincide quite tightly with the ethnic cleav-
age5. Albanians (94.5 per cent), Bosniaks (1.7 per cent) and 
Turks (1.1 per cent) tend to profess Islam, while Serbs (4 
per cent) Orthodox Christianity. Kosovo follows the ideo-
logical pattern of other Balkan nation-states, where the na-
tion is defined both in ethno-linguistic and ethno-religious 
terms. Hence, a ‘true Kosovar’ (or Kosovan Albanian) 
must be an Albanian-speaking Muslim, a ‘true Greek’ must 
be a Greek-speaking Orthodox Christian, a ‘true Bulgar-
ian’ must be a Bulgarian-speaking Orthodox Christian, a 
‘true Serb’ must be a Serbian-speaking Orthodox Chris-
tian, a ‘true Bosniak’ must be a Bosnian-speaking Muslim, 
a ‘true Montenegrin’ must be a Montenegrin-speaking 
Orthodox Christian, a ‘true Macedonian’ must be a Mace-
donian-speaking Orthodox Christian, a ‘true Turk’ must 
be a Turkish-speaking Muslim, a ‘true Croatian’ must be a 
Croatian-speaking Catholic, or a ‘true Romanian’ must be 
a Romanian-speaking Orthodox Christian.
On the contrary, for a ‘true Albanian’ from Albania 
it is sufficient to speak Albanian alone, and there are no 
religious features as a defining one in that Albanian-ness, 
which is practiced within the borders of the Albanian na-
tion-state. However, this situation causes a paradoxical rift 
within the broader definition of that also encompasses the 
Albanian ethnic areas located outside Albania. Albanians 
in Kosovo and Macedonia are almost exclusively Muslims. 
Hence, a ‘true Albanian’ in these two states must be an 
Albanian-speaking Muslim. This conflation of language 
and religion, typical for the rest of the Balkans, stands in 
stark opposition to the purely ethno-linguistic definition 
of in Albania. Only Montenegro’s Albanians, who are ei-
ther Muslims or Catholics, in their poly-confessionalism 
are similar to Albania’s Albanians. 
Many Albanians educated in school to wish for a ‘big-
ger Albania’ that would encompass all Albanian-speakers 
in a single polity, in the course of their lives, may find out 
to their surprise, that Kosovo/Macedonian Albanians are 
quite different from Albanian (and Montenegrin) Alba-
nians. The former tend to be suspicious of the latter’s easy 
going and unideologized poly-confessionality, while the 
latter are distrustful of the former’s ideological fixation on 
religion that uncomfortably stands too close to what is ste-
reotypically perceived as ‘Islamism’ (all too often and rath-
er incorrectly equated with Islamic fundamentalism’). This 
inner-Albanian ideological division may yet turn out to be 
the most effective barrier that will keep Kosovo from enter-
ing a state union with Albania. From the vantage of religion 
and language, the two Albanian polities of Albania and 
Kosovo are eerily similar to Germany and Austria. Both 
latter states share the same standard German language, 
but Austria is confessionally homogenous (Catholic), like 
Kosovo, while Germany is heterogeneous in this respect 
(Protestant and Catholic), like Albania itself. In addition, 
the standard German language being based on the (East) 
Middle German dialects of today’s central Germany differs 
from the Upper German (Alemannic) dialects of southern 
Germany (Bavaria) and Austria (cf. Ammon 1995). Simi-
larly, the standard Albanian language steeped into the Tosk 
dialect of southern Albania and is close in meaning to the 
Gheg dialect of Kosovo and northern Albania.
THe Millet System
The creation of Christian nation-states in the Balkans 
in areas seized from the Ottoman Empire during the 19th 
century was followed by the founding of Albania in 1912 
and the destruction of this empire in the wake of World 
War I. The secular (but culturally Islamic) Turkish nation-
state replaced the Ottoman Empire in Anatolia and the 
south-easternmost corner of the Balkan Peninsula. In the 
Ottoman Empire the ‘people(s) of the Book’ (أهل الكتاب 
‎ ′Ahl al-Kitāb in Arabic, Ehl-i kitab in Osmanlıca), that 
is monotheists (meaning Muslims, Jews and Christians 
of various creeds), were considered to be Ehl-i Zimmi 
(Osmanlıca for ‘protected people[s]’), and as such tolerat-
ed and incorporated into the polity’s structure through the 
means of the religion/church-based non-territorial (per-
sonal) autonomy [32, p. 158; 79, p. 254]. The autonomy for 
the faithful of a given kind of monotheism, together with 
this autonomy’s ecclesiastical structures, became known as 
millet (from Arabic ملة millah for ‘religious community’). 
The Rum (literally, ‘Roman’6) millet was for the empire’s 
Orthodox Christians headed by the Ecumenical Patriarch 
in Constantinople. Judaists or Yahudiler in Osmanlıca 
(Jews) were grouped in their own Jewish millet. The faith-
ful of the Armenian Apostolic Church constituted the Ar-
menian millet. Muslims were not organized in a separate 
Muslim millet, but their privileged position in the empire 
ensured that this population and their institutions for all 
practical reasons functioned as a millet of such a kind. 
Furthermore, when Ottoman sultans wanted to refer to 
the totality of Muslims living in their empire, they invari-
ably spoke of them as ‘the Millet of Islam’ [36, p. 212].
The Serbian nation-state was established in the 1810s 
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for the Slavophone Orthodox Christians of the Patriarch-
ate of Peć (abolished in 1766). The Greek nation-state 
founded during the following decade of the 19th century 
aspired for overhauling the entire Orthodox (Rum) mil-
let into a Greek nation. But the Ottomans’ successful curb 
on these ethno-religious aspirations of Greeks, combined 
with the rise of ethno-linguistically underpinned nation-
alisms of Orthodox Slavs, increasingly limited the Rum 
millet to Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians, alongside 
a handful of speakers of other languages as long as they 
conceded to use Greek in education and for written com-
munication [5, p. 25-26, 28, 71].
Faced with the military domination of the West and 
Russia intervening in the Ottoman lands, the sultan ap-
proved the new lines of division coalescing within the Or-
thodox (Rum) millet for preserving the territorial integrity 
of the Ottoman Empire [36, p. 216-217, 223]. For instance, 
in 1870 the Sultan agreed with the founding of the Bulgar-
ian Exarchate, which encompassed the territories of today’s 
Bulgaria, Macedonia and northern Greece. In this way, the 
unity of the Orthodox (Rum) millet was finally shattered, 
and the empire’s Slavophone Orthodox Christians were 
organized as a brand-new ‘Bulgar millet.’ This develop-
ment ideologically and politically blocked the northward 
expansion of Greece until the Balkan Wars and the Great 
War in the 1910s [50, p. 78-79]. The creation and expan-
sion of nation-states increasingly territorialized the previ-
ously non-territorial millets [85, p. 242-243]. The ‘proper’ 
post-Ottoman nation-state was designed for a single millet, 
largely irrespective of any difference in actual vernaculars. 
In this way, Serbia emerged as a nation-state for the Slavic-
speaking faithful of the autocephalous fragment of the Rum 
(Orthodox) millet centered on the erstwhile Patriarchate of 
İpek (Peć) [47, p. 49]. Greece was built as a nation-state for 
the Rum (Orthodox) millet’s faithful who employed the 
Greek-language original of the Gospels in liturgy. Bulgaria 
was constructed as a Slavophone nation-state for the Bul-
gar millet (that is, the Bulgarian Exarchate), while Turkey 
and Israel as nation-states gathered within their borders the 
members of the Muslim and Jewish millets, respectively 
[88, p. 10-12, 170]. Obviously, as it is well-known the Turk-
ish nation-state limited itself to the Muslims in Anatolia, 
speaking Turkish, Kurdish, Laz (Georgian), Circassian, Al-
banian, Tatar or Gagauz, among others [12, p. 40-41].
THe Albanian Dilemma
After 1878 the predominantly Albanian-speaking 
vilayets (Ottoman administrative regions) of İşkodra 
(Shkodra), Yanya (Ioannina), Kosova (Kosovo) and 
Manastır‎ (Bitola) became a semi-isolated promontory of 
the Ottoman Empire encircled by the Adriatic and Ionian 
seas in the west, while in the north and south by the Chris-
tian nation-states and powers of Montenegro, Austria–
Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece. The fear was that 
if the carving of the Ottoman Balkans continue in accor-
dance with the principle of one millet for one nation-state, 
this would mean the apportioning of Orthodox Albanian-
speakers to Greece, Catholic Albanian-speakers to Mon-
tenegro and Austria-Hungary (or possibly to Italy), while 
Muslim Albanian-speakers would be expelled as ‘Turks’ to 
‘go home’ to the would-be Turkish nation-state in Anatolia 
[39, p. 46; 57].
A frightening premonition of such a scenario led to 
the rise of the Albanian grass-roots opposition in the form 
of the League of Prizren in 1878–1881 and to the subse-
quent emergence of the purely ethno-linguistic concept of 
the non-millet-based (non-religious) nation of Albanian-
speakers. The leaders of the movement were torn between 
their Ottomanism and the Albanian political program ide-
ally to be carried out in an autonomous manner within the 
Ottoman Empire [86, p. 435]. A solution would have been 
an autonomy for some Unified Albanian Vilayet (‘region’) 
composed of the Ottoman vilayets of İskodra (Shkodra), 
Kosova, Manastır (Bitola) and Yanya (Ioannina) [78; 87, 
p. 34]. But unlike in the case of Christians, the Sultan 
was not ready to consider such a solution for part of the 
Muslim millet. From his perspective, it would have con-
stituted a serious weakening of the unity of the empire›s 
demographically Muslim foundation, or the Millet of Is-
lam. On the other hand, the coalescing Albanian elite and 
the average Albanian-speaker saw the Sultan›s decision as 
endangering their own safety in this far-flung corner of the 
empire almost entirely at the mercy of Christian powers 
and neighbors, who would not consider any concessions 
for Albanian-speakers [72; 78].
When the First Balkan War commenced, the Alba-
nians had no choice but to take matters into their hands, 
and thus proclaimed their own nation-state in 1912. Luck-
ily for them, none of the European great powers wanted to 
fortify an already existing Balkan nation-state with a grant 
of ethnically Albanian lands because it could have given an 
undue advantage to another great power›s client state in 
this region. The story is well known and recently was cel-
ebrated in numerous publications brought out for the cel-
ebrations of the centenary of the Albanian nation-state in 
2012 [53, p. 24-124]. Not surprisingly, this is also the main 
story narrated in the aforementioned school textbooks of 
history [82, p. 85-109; 91, p. 84-105], in the school atlas 
of Albanian history [81, p. 22-39] and in general school 
atlases of history [33, p. 76-85; 54, p. 17-19].
THe Neglected Ottoman Legacy
What schoolchildren and other readers cannot learn 
from the textbooks and atlases of history is how the Alba-
nians living in today’s Albania became poly-confessional 
and why this religious diversity does not cause any con-
siderable political and identification tensions, which is (or 
was) the norm in other post-Ottoman nation-states in the 
Balkans and Anatolia [31; 63]. Early modern Albanian 
history is construed as the period extending between the 
Middle Ages and the founding of the Albanian nation-
state [91, p. 68-93]. In turn, the beginning of the early 
modern times is defined as the establishment of Ottoman 
domination in the ethno-linguistically Albanian lands be-
tween the 1380s and 1410s [82, p. 70].
But in the sections devoted to this early modern or 
Ottoman period, the textbooks and atlases proudly place, 
on the one hand, the aforementioned ‘struggle for Alba-
nian national statehood’, while on the other the Ottoman 
vassal-turned-Catholic warlord, Skanderbeg (Gjergj Kas-
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trioti, 1405–1468), who first, upon conversion from Ortho-
dox Christianity to Islam adopted the name İskender7 and 
became an Ottoman bey. In turn, his full title İskender Bey 
yielded the Latinized form Skanderbeg (cf. Francus 1544). 
In 1443 he deserted the Ottomans, and after converting to 
Catholicism carved out for himself a Christian polity in 
today’s northern Albania. Under Skanderbeg’s leadership, 
the Christian population composed of Albanian-, Slavic-, 
Greek- and Vlach (Aromanian)-speakers successfully re-
pelled Ottoman attacks in the mountainous terrain until 
a decade after the ruler’s death, when the polity eventu-
ally fell to the Ottomans in 1478. The two textbooks of 
history under review devote to Skanderbeg, respectively, 
nine and 10 pages [82, p. 68-77], while 25 and 22 pages 
to the rise of the Albanian national movement [82, p. 85-
109; 91, p. 84-105]. As a result, in these two textbooks, five 
and six pages, respectively, remain for covering the entire 
Ottoman period of more than half a millennium [82, p. 
79-84; 91, p. 78-83]. The irony is that half of the space is 
taken by an overview of the semi-polities won by the two 
Ottoman governors of Albanian origin who went rogue, 
namely, Kara Mahmud Pasha (1749–1796) of the Sanjak 
of İşkodra (Shkodra) and Ali Pasha Tepelena (1740–1822) 
of Yannina (Ioannina). The latter warlord controlled most 
of what today is northern Greece and southern Albania 
[82, p. 82-84; 91, p. 81-83]. Hence, effectively the Ottoman 
period is discussed most sketchily on a mere three pages in 
both the textbooks [82, p. 79-81; 91, 78-80].
By comparison, these two textbooks devote, respec-
tively, 25 and 21 pages to the ancient Illyrians and their 
state(s) seen as the ethnic (or rather mythic) origin of the 
Albanians [82, p. 18-42; 91, p. 23-43]. Not surprisingly, any 
Albanian, whom I met, was ready to tell me something 
about the glory of the ancient ‘Albanian’ Illyria [51], while 
my friend Bardhyl Selimi was even named after an Illyr-
ian monarch. The name Bardhyl is an Albanized render-
ing of the name of the monarch Bardylis (Βάρδυλις) who 
ruled the Kingdom of Dardania (largely coterminous with 
today’s Kosovo) during the first half of the Fourth century 
BCE [16]. The myth of ‘Albanian Illyria’ is cultivated for na-
tional ends to this day, first, for ‘proving’ the autochthony 
of the Albanians to the western Balkans where they live at 
present, and second, to underscore the idea of a ‘Greater 
Albania’ [28, p. 10]. Namely, in antiquity all hypothetical ‘Il-
lyrians-Albanians’ lived in a single kingdom, so nowadays 
a single polity should be achieved for all the Albanians, too 
[24, p. 247]. The irony is that during the 1830s and 1840s 
early Croatian / South Slav (Yugoslav) and Panslav activists 
and nationalists used the term ‘Illyrian’ for denoting their 
own language and national movement [19]. 
In the two atlases of history under discussion, two 
and four pages, respectively, are given to the story of Skan-
derbeg [33, p. 71, 73; 81, p. 13-16], one and two, respec-
tively, to the exploits of Kara Mahmud Pasha and Ali Pasha 
Tepelena8 [33, p. 74; 81, p. 19-20], 10 and 18, respectively, 
to the growth of the Albanian national movement [33, p. 
76-85; 81, p. 22-39], while as few as two pages only in both 
atlases are devoted to the coverage of the Ottoman times 
[33, p. 72, 75; 81, p. 17, 21]. And again, these two atlases 
discuss the Illyrians on three and six pages, respectively 
[33, p. 64-66; 81, p. 4-9].
THe Ottoman Past Rejected
The world-renowned Albanian author, Ismail Kadare 
(born in 1936), is also rightly feted at home as Albania’s 
most important living writer. But a streak of unrepentant 
anti-Ottomanism weaves through his hypnotically crystal-
line prose. Some Ottoman institutions – looking strange to 
the modern Western eye – Kadare employed in his books 
and stories as metaphors for depicting the abuse of power 
in the authoritarian state, for instance, the practice of stor-
ing written records of dreams in an archive [41], using or 
imposing blindness for administrative purposes [45]9, or 
maintaining the post of curser [43]. This veiled criticism 
of the stark realities in communist Albania with the em-
ployment of Ottoman-inflected metaphors unfortunately 
reinforces the average Albanian’s already steadily negative 
image of the Ottoman past as imparted at school both dur-
ing the communist times and nowadays [80].
This appears to be a case of adopting wholesale Ori-
entalization [74], or the Western (European) skewed and 
stereotypical perception of the Balkans [37; 83] for think-
ing about the Ottoman past of Albania. Many of such ste-
reotypes, as those of ‘five hundred years of Turkish [Ot-
toman] occupation’, ‘Turkish [Ottoman] yoke’, or ‘Turkish 
[Ottoman] atrocities’ used to be the staple of the specifical-
ly Christian propaganda directed against the Muslim Otto-
man Empire. With the rise of the Christian nation-states in 
the Balkans these stereotypes were made into the corner-
stone of their national master narratives [38; 61]. The Ot-
toman Empire was and still is blamed for nearly all today’s 
ills observed in these polities, especially for their economic 
backwardness (as measured against the yardstick of [West] 
Germany, where hundreds of thousands of migrants from 
the post-Ottoman states have found gainful employment 
since the 1950s [29]. Turkish secular and nationalist his-
torians, politicians and intellectuals also adopted some of 
these anti-Ottoman stereotypes, but obviously not those 
that could be interpreted as anti-Turkish. What is more, 
they replied to the stereotype of ‘Turkish atrocities’ with 
their own of ‘Christian atrocities’ that were equally (or 
even more) numerous and lasted considerably longer, that 
is, from the 18th through the 20th century [57]. In addition, 
they developed a specifically Turkish stereotype of ‘per-
fidious treachery’ on the part of the post-Ottoman Balkan 
nations in return for ‘benevolent Ottoman rule’. Last but 
not least, since 2003, when Turkey has found itself under 
the rule of the secularist but firmly pro-Islamic Justice and 
Development Party led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Ot-
toman past of this country has been increasingly rehabili-
tated and incorporated into the Turkish national master 
narrative [71].
Kadare’s anti-Ottomanism, shared with the average 
Albanian, seems to be a by-product of the modernizing 
propaganda and effort in communist Albania, which found 
its historical Other in the ‘bourgeois, oppressive, backward 
and essentially medieval in its demeanor’ Ottoman Em-
pire. This image of the Muslim world was widespread in 
the Soviet Union, where Kadare studied [46], and was also 
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well entrenched in other Soviet bloc countries where many 
Albanians received university education prior to Tirana’s 
rift with Moscow at the turn of the 1960s. These students 
brought this negative image back home to Albania, thus re-
inforcing the local anti-Ottoman sentiment. (Such colloca-
tions as pesëqind vjet pushtimit turk / osman / otoman [five 
hundred years of Turkish / Ottoman occupation], zgjedha 
osmane / ottoman / turk [Turkish / Ottoman yoke] turn 
up time and again in official Albanian-language publica-
tions and academic monographs published in Albania and 
Kosovo [11, p. 16-17; 14, p. 134, 489; 22, p. 68; 62, p. 19, 25, 
28; 70, p. 101; 73, p. 38, 39, 57; 80, p. 52, 60, 125, 217; 89, 
p. 6, 76, 168; 90, p. 199]. To my knowledge, none of those, 
who joined the ranks of the ‘chattering classes’, took care 
to point out that these anti-Ottoman stereotypes are self-
defeating, being directed against Albania’s own past and 
the predominantly Muslim character of its population. It 
is the case of a not fully-realized self-hatred that constantly 
produces new generations of ‘Muslim-hating Muslims’. 
What is more, this persisting negative attitude toward the 
Ottoman past, that actually made Albania what it is, feeds 
back into the anti-Ottomanism of the ideologically Chris-
tian Balkan nation-states, proving in their eyes that this 
sentiment ‘must be right’, when even Muslim Albanians 
concur on the issue. Neither does Kadare appear to no-
tice the irony of this paradox (also encapsulated in his very 
own Islamic name ‘Ismail’; similarly, most Albanians bran-
dish Islamic names or surnames, too), which could lend 
itself to a great novel of ideas that would transcend the re-
ceived national preconceptions and opinions. Beyond the 
aforementioned metaphors directed against authoritarian-
ism, metaphors that build on anti-Ottoman stereotypes, 
Kadare presents the introduction of Islam to Albania as 
an authoritarian-like imposition [40], which ominously 
diverted Albania from the ‘correct’ (read: Christian and 
Western European) path of development [42]. Predictably 
the author eulogizes (though in typically his own oblique 
manner) Skanderbeg’s persistent but eventually doomed 
military resistance against the Ottomans [44]. In one short 
novel, the writer also focuses on the historical event of the 
1830s massacre of about 500 southern (Tosk-speaking and 
Muslim) Albanian beys (that is, chiefs, warlords, village 
leaders) in Manastır (Bitola), as a clear example of ‘Ot-
toman perfidy’ [4, p. 79-80; 45]. Obviously, the massacre 
could be equally interpreted as a long-awaited reintroduc-
tion of law and order, which since the turn of the late 18th 
century had been time and again breached in this area by 
such rogue governors of Albanian ethnic background as 
Kara Mahmud Pasha or Ali Pasha Tepelena, of course, 
with complicity of the local beys.
Both rogue governors are lauded in the aforemen-
tioned Albanian history textbooks and school atlases of 
history, almost as early Albanian national leaders, despite 
the fact that they ‘ruled’ over multiethnic and poly-confes-
sional populaces, which was the norm across the Ottoman 
Empire. Curiously, the most successful of all these Alba-
nian Ottoman-officials-turned-rogues, Muhammad Ali 
Pasha of Egypt (Mehmet Ali Pasha in Albanian, Kavalalı 
Mehmet Ali Paşa in Turkish, 1769–1849) does not earn 
a mention in the textbooks under review. In the wake of 
Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt (1798–1801), as an Ottoman 
commander, between 1801 and 1805, Muhammad Ali 
gradually seized power in this rich and extensive Ottoman 
province with the world’s oldest university of Al-Azhar 
(founded in 972) to boot. He deftly used the opportunity 
afforded by the internecine struggle for domination over 
this province between Egypt’s old (pre-Ottoman) Mam-
eluke elite and the Ottomans. In 1805 the Sultan recog-
nized Muhammad Ali as Governor (Wali) of Egypt, but 
Muhammad Ali preferred to style himself as Viceroy (Khe-
dive) [27]. In 1811 Muhammad Ali sealed his seizure of 
power in Egypt by massacring the Mameluke elite (around 
500 officials and landlords) during a banquet [58, p. 59], 
like the Ottomans would do with the Albanian beys in 
Manastır 19 years later. Hence, it could be argued that the 
Ottomans learned this cruel ploy from Albanians.
The Mameluke warrior elite, which had governed 
Egypt for almost six centuries since 1250, was replaced by 
Muhammad Ali and his Albanian soldiers overnight. The 
new ethnically Albanian elite, under the Muhammad Ali 
(formally known as Alawiyya) dynasty, ruled and modern-
ized Egypt, turning it into a regional empire that at times 
extended from the Peloponnesus, Crete, Cyprus and Syria 
in the north to Sudan, Eritrea and parts of today’s Somalia 
in the south, and to what at present is Saudi Arabia in the 
east [1; 21]. This Albanian dynasty and elite’s rule lasted 
until 1953 when an Arab national republic was proclaimed 
in Egypt, the monarchy abolished, and 4,000 Albanian 
families (that is, around 20,000 people) were summarily 
expelled from the country [23, p. 126]. To my knowledge 
there is not a single monograph or novel devoted to this 
amazing century-and-a-half-long Albanian adventure in 
Egypt. The topic is waiting for ‘its Kadare’, who would do 
justice to it.
Obviously(?), these events are not mentioned in the 
Albanian history textbooks or school atlases of history un-
der review. This story goes too much against the grain of 
the national curriculum’s anti-Ottoman sentiment and the 
required focus on the lands compactly inhabited by Alba-
nian-speakers. That Albanians could prosper under Otto-
man rule and lead at the empire’s forefront of moderniza-
tion, even without going rogue. The typical path of highly 
successful career within the fold of the Ottoman official-
dom is offered by the example of the Albanian Köprülü 
(Qyprilliu or Kypriljoti in Albanian) family from the town 
of Köprü(lü) (or Veles in today’s Macedonia), whose seven 
members served as the Ottoman sultans’ grand viziers 
(akin to ‘prime ministers’) between 1656 and 1711 [2, p. 
313-319]. Thousands upon thousands of other Albanians 
entered the Ottoman bureaucracy and army if they were 
Muslims, or engaged in trade and commerce when of dif-
ferent religions. They availed themselves of the large and 
stable Ottoman sphere of borderless travel, employment 
and of the free circulation of goods and ideas that used to 
extend from today’s Algeria in the west to present-day Tur-
key in the east, from what nowadays is southern Ukraine 
or Hungary in the north to today’s Egypt, Yemen and 
Oman in the south.
E-ISSN 2537–6152             REVISTA DE ETNOLOGIE ŞI CULTUROLOGIE           Chișinău, 2016         Volumul XX102
On 28 November 2015 I had the privilege to partici-
pate in the international conference ‘Transition in Retro-
spect: 25 Years After the Fall of Communism’, organized 
in Tirana by the University of New York Tirana (UNYT). 
In the panel on ‘Historical and Comparative Analysis of 
Transition’, I happened to attend the lecture of Professor 
Fatos Tarifa (Rector of the UNYT) on ‘Communist and 
Post-Communist Disparities and Universals’. In the course 
of this talk and during the follow-up discussion, I was 
surprised to hear that the ‘Ottoman occupation’ was held 
responsible for present-day Albania’s relative economic 
and technological backwardness (obviously as measured 
against Germany or the Czech Republic, not against the 
benchmark of Moldova or Belarus). I proposed that the 
communist system and the self-imposed isolation of com-
munist Albania might be better candidates for culprits in 
this regard. However, in response, I heard the usual litany 
of anti-Ottoman stereotypes that did not constitute any 
coherent argument, which would unequivocally connect 
Ottoman rule to the perceived Albanian backwardness. In 
turn, I alluded to some developments under Ottoman rule 
that in the Western theory of development are viewed in 
positive light. Namely, political, economic, social and cul-
tural life of the Ottoman Empire overwhelmingly unfold-
ed in cities and towns, however small. The urbanization 
of space and society, which followed the Ottoman take-
over of the Balkans and the establishment of lasting and 
stable peace (Pax Ottomanica), was quite unprecedented 
in the Balkans and stood in stark contrast to the village-
centered, rural character of economy in the Christian ar-
eas surrounding the Ottoman possessions in southeastern 
Europe [17; 48, p. 75, 90]. This Ottoman urbanization 
brought about monetary economy to the newly conquered 
areas, where non-monetary barter had been typical for 
the pre-Ottoman period. Importantly, the system of serf-
dom that during the Christian period had tied peasants to 
land and forced them to render free agricultural labor to 
noble land owners was terminated in the Balkans under 
Ottoman rule [30, p. 24-25; 35, p. 1-18]. Serfdom, which 
perpetuated the rural (and thus premodern) character of 
society and economy, persisted from Prussia in the north 
to the Austrian Empire in the south (that is, to today’s Aus-
tria, Western Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, 
Slovenia and westernmost Croatia) until the middle of the 
19th century [66]. It can be argued that the Ottoman rule, 
instead of keeping the Balkans backward, actually gave the 
region a head start in this regard by emancipating peasant-
ry. Unfortunately, this precious advantage was squandered 
during the numerous wars in the 19th and 20th centuries (in 
quest for the ethnically and historically ‘correct’ national 
territory) followed by multilateral expulsions, and under 
the pressure of the Great European powers that imposed 
on the Balkan nation-states disadvantageous economic 
and political terms [8]. What is more, the dismantling of 
the serfdom system in the Russian Empire (that is, from 
present-day Lithuania, Belarus and eastern Poland in the 
north to Ukraine and Moldova in the south) commenced 
as late as the early 1860s and continued until the Bolshevik 
Revolution in 1917 [49; 64].
Conclusion: Albania as an Unaware Preserver of 
Ottoman Values?
The pronounced rejection of the Ottoman past as 
the direct and most important source of today’s Albania, 
alongside its society and culture, creates an intellectual 
and ideological paradox that sits ill at ease (almost schizo-
phrenically so) in the midst of what currently Albanian-
ness is about. The Albanians themselves, together with Al-
banian politicians and intellectuals, are right to be proud 
of the peaceful and easygoing poly-confessional character 
of their nation-state [25; 69, p. 24]. But it is regrettable that 
the vast majority of them are patently unable to see that 
this advantageous sociopolitical reality of Albania is an 
Ottoman legacy. When the Ottoman Empire was divided 
among successor nation-states, the previously non-territo-
rial millets were territorialized and each enclosed within 
the boundaries of its own nation-state. Religious in their 
character millets were transformed into ethno-religious 
nations that, in turn typically were required to become 
ethno-linguistically homogenous [75, p. 96-98]. 
As a result, in today’s Balkans nation-states are sep-
arated from one another by the dual barrier of language 
and religion (or ecclesiastical autocephaly in the case of 
the Slavophone Orthodox polities). Only Albania avoided 
following this highly divisive path of national statehood 
building, legitimation and maintenance. In a way (if the 
clearly national in its character insistence on ethno-lin-
guistic homogeneity is overlooked for a moment), Albania 
can be seen as the very last remaining part of the Ottoman 
Empire, true to the sociopolitical organization of this erst-
while realm. Namely, as many as three millets brush shoul-
ders freely in the Albanian nation-state, that is, Muslims11, 
Catholics and Orthodox Christians. I should also mention 
the fourth – Jewish (Judaist) – millet12. During World War 
II Albania was the sole country in the Europe occupied by 
Germany and Italy, where not only practically all the local 
Jews were saved, but their number actually grew steeply 
(eleven-fold, from about 24 to circa 300 [23, p. 218-219]), 
since many Jews from outside this country found safe ha-
ven in wartime Albania under Italian, and then German, 
occupation [3; 77]. The uplifting story deserves to be better 
known across the world, and should be made into a shin-
ing multicultural pillar of present-day Albania’s national 
master narrative befitting this new post-communist epoch 
of European integration and globalization. 
Apart from Jews, Albanians also saved around 25,000 
Italian soldiers, who were mercilessly hunted down and 
killed by German (and Austrian) troops after Italy’s 1943 
change of sides in the Second World War [13, p. 501; 19, 
p. 185]. Many of them joined the Albanian resistance [65, 
p. 120]. Typically, (predominantly Muslim) Albanians’ 
welcoming behavior extended equally toward former Ital-
ian occupiers (read: enemies and ‘infidels’) and persecuted 
Jews is explained by referral to the Albanian tradition of 
besa, or the obligation to protect guests in one’s own house 
at whatever a cost [10; 24]. Well, it might be true, but an-
other, equally plausible explication is offered by the Ot-
toman (or more broadly, Islamic) institution of Dhimmi 
(Arabic ذمي for ‘protected persons’, rendered as Zimmi in 
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Osmanlıca) extended to non-Muslim monotheists of all 
creeds across the Ottoman Empire. This institution con-
stituted the legal cornerstone of the empire’s millet system 
[36, p. 213, 216]. And nowadays, in a curiously unrealized 
(almost unconscious) way, nameless and unnoticed, this 
Ottoman millet system for all the Dhimmis (now, Muslims 
included in their number) of various confessions continues 
to underpin society and politics in today’s Albania. Per-
haps, it would make more sense for the European future of 
Albania in the globalized world to consciously embrace the 
country’s Ottoman past, obviously without glossing over 
Ottoman rule’s dark corners, but equally with doing justice 
to its valuable achievements. This, among others, would 
entail covering the Ottoman past of Albania in school text-
books and school atlases of history13 in more depth and in 
a fairer and more objective manner. More space should be 
given to the Ottoman Empire and the role of Albanians 
in the poly-confessional realm’s transcontinental and in-
terethnic networks [59] than to the mythic Illyrian origin 
of the Albanian nation. Skanderbeg already functioning 
as Albania’s main state-approved national hero for over a 
century must be retained for the sake of national feeling 
and cohesion that his image generates. The warlord’s coat-
of-arms of the double-headed (Byzantine and Orthodox 
Christian) eagle on the red background serves as Albania’s 
national flag. But the school textbook coverage of Skander-
beg’s struggle against the Ottomans might be rationalized 
and pared down so that it could be seen for what it was, that 
is, the rather brief transition period from Christian rule to 
the half-a-millennium-long Pax Ottomanica in the Alba-
nian lands. Making good use of this lengthy, and relatively 
stable and prosperous period, Albanian-speakers created 
their modern culture and nation, even if at times in oppo-
sition to the Ottoman government’s wishes. Significantly – 
unlike the Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs or Montenegrins – the 
Albanians never waged full-fledged war on the Ottoman 
Empire. Had they done so, for sure, Albanian soldiers, in 
equal measure, would have fought on both sides of such a 
hypothetical Albanian-Ottoman (Turkish) front, thus most 
probably, precluding the possibility of creating a tolerant 
poly-confessional Albanian nation-state, which Albania is 
nowadays.This valuable social and political capital is the 
Ottoman Empire’s lasting bequest to Albania and its future.
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